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JURISDICTION: PUBLIC LAW 280-LOCAL
REGULATION OF PROTECTED INDIAN LANDS
Louis D. PersonsII
Introduction
Congressional Indian policy has suffered from the vacillation of
national politics and has generally reflected the popular sentiment
of the times.' The political tide flowed in favor of those favoring
assimilation of Indians into the "national" culture duing the
decade of the 1950's and on into the early part of the 1960's.' One

of the chief means used by assimilationists was the discontinuance
of the tribe as a legal entity. The official congressional policy of
termination was established by House Concurrent Resolution 108
in 1953.2 Under this resolution approximately 109 Indian tribes
and bands were terminated and ceased to exist as legal entities.'
PublicLaw 280
Another expression of congressional disfavor with tribal
organization was Public Law 280,' which mandatorily transferred
civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians to five
specific states and provided the mechanism for transfer of jurisdiction to other states.6 The rationale expressed to support this act
implied that the Indians were on a social parity with other state
citizens and that they "should therefore be released from secondclass citizenship as well as [from] the paternalistic supervision of
the BIA."'
In actuality, there was an absolute lack of serious investigation
of the social condition of the affected Indians to determine if they
were in fact ready for integration. 5 Viewed in context, Public Law
1. Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the FederalSystem: Inherent
Right of CongressionalLicense,51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600, 608 (1976).
2. Id. at 616.

3. H.R. Con. Res. 108, Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132.
4. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
139, 151 (1977).
5. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, amendingch. 53 of 18
U.S.C. to add § 1162 and ch. 85 of 28 U.S.C. to add § 1360. The five original states were
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958. Act
of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545.
6. Ericson & Snow, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 460

(1970).
7. Goldberg, PublicLaw 280: The Limits of State Jurisdictionover Reservation Indians,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535,543 (1975).

8. Id. at 543.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1978

280 was enacted because "assimilation [was] cheaper for the
federal government and preferred by states that dislike[d] the
presence of an Indian sovereignty within their borders.... "'
Public Law 280 was considered to be unsatisfactory in several
key aspects by both the states and the Indians. There was no provision for prior Indian consent to state jurisdiction, nor was there
provision for return of jurisdiction to the federal government if
state control proved unworkable."° The affected states found that
although they were granted the jurisdiction, the power to tax the
Indian lands as a source of revenue to pay for the costs of exercising jurisdiction was withheld and no alternative federal financing
was found to be forthcoming."
Also at issue was the extent of the jurisdiction available to the
states and their subdivisions and the protection afforded the Indians by the exception clauses. Officials desiring to expand local
control tended to read the exception clauses narrowly as
precluding only actual encumbrance of federally protected lands.'"
Conversely, those favoring the Indians, who were seeking to
preserve the remnants of their former protected status, gave wider
reading to the clauses and sought to exclude local regulation entirely.'3
The "Encumbrance"Test
The first case to consider specifically the issue of local regulation of the use of trust lands and the possibility that such regulation constituted an encumbrance within the context of Public Law
280 was Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co." In that action the county sought to impose a local zoning ordinance to
preclude the Seattle Disposal Company (a lessee of the Tulalip
tribes) from using allotted Indian land for a refuse disposal site.
The county argued alternatively that the lands in question were
within the jurisdiction of Washington by either operation of the
General Allotment Act or Public Law 280."s The county further
argued (1) that the zoning ordinances did not constitute an encurnbrance as disallowed within the exceptions to Public Law 280;
9.Id. at 536.
10. Id. at 558. Both defects were subsequently corrected (82 Stat. 77).
11. Id. at 551.
12. Id.at 583.
13. Id.
14. 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied,389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
15. Id.at 670, 671, 425 P.2d at 25.
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(2) that a lessee should not be allowed the benefit of the special
rights available to the Indians; and (3) that exemption of the Indian lands from zoning ordinances applicable to other lands in the
county was a breach of the equal protection clause of the Constitution."
The court denied each of these arguments. The equal protection
argument was found invalid because the court considered the pending case an example of juxtaposed but differing regulation by different sovereigns, which is acceptable in a federal system." The
court also stated that regulation of an Indian lessee was an attempt
to interfere with property indirectly and thus accomplish obliquely a federally prohibited control." The jurisdiction argument was
predicated on a provision of the General Allotment Act of 1887
which provided that alloted lands would be state-controlled af4er
a 25-year trust period. This argument was dismissed due to the inapplicability of that Act to the particular Washington lands in
question."
The court agreed that Washington did have the jurisdiction over
Indians provided by Public Law 280 but then examined the exception clause of that law to determine if the pending case fell within
the purview of one of the exceptions. The court found that the ordinance in question did constitute an encumbrance on the land
within the meaning of Section 1360 of Title 28 of the United States
Code."0 In reaching this decision, the court used a definition of encumbrance from the case law of Washington which provided that
an encumbrance was any "burden upon land depreciative of its
value, such as lien, easement, or servitude, which, though adverse
to the interest of the landowner, does not conflict with his conveyance of the land in fee." 2' The ordinance in question was found
to diminish the value of the land in question and, therefore, to
constitute an encumbrance.' The judgment of the district court
was affirmed for the defendant Seattle Disposal Company.
16. Id. at 672, 673, 425 P.2d at 26, 27.
17. Id. 673, 674, 425 P.2d at 27.
18. Id. at 673, 425 P.2d at 26.
19. Id. at 670, 671, 425 P.2d at 25.
20. Id. at 672, 425 P.2d at 26.
21. Id. Definition of encumbrance from Hobb v. Severence, 32 Wash. 2d 159, 167, 201
P.2d 156, 160 (1948). The normal rules of construction would require that the state use the
federal definition of the term rather than as in this case, the definition used by the state. M.
PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 281 (1973).

22. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 672, 425 P.2d 22, 26,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967). In the dissent Judge Hale argued for a more restrictive
interpretation of encumbrance as "a burden on the land and affecting the title thereto or one
impairing the power of alienation such as a mortgage, lien, easement, lease, or other
disability to fee ownership." Id. at 28.
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The question of an encumbrance on Indian lands was considered by the California courts in the case of People v. Rhoades
in 1970.' The court here considered the applicability of a state law
requiring a firebreak around an inhabited structure in a forested
area to an Indian living on reservation lands." In examining this
question, the court found that the law protected a legitimate state
interest in the preservation of its forest lands.' The court found
that this was not applied in a discriminatory manner and that the
requirement that the defendant comply with the law did not constitute an encumbrance on the land."' In reaching this decision, the
court used substantially the same definition of "encumbrance" as
had been applied in the Snohomish case. However, the court then
proceeded to disregard the broad interpretation given to the
language in Snohomish and to construe the term narrowly.""The
judicial construction maxim that laws affecting Indians will be
construed to the Indians' benefit was discussed by the court in the
consideration of the term "encumbrance." However, this maxim
was completely disregarded in the narrow, unfavorable construction of the term given by the court."0
In Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego,'
the federal district court considered the validity of the application
of a county gambling ordinance to reservation lands. This contest
arose when the Indians sought to establish a card house where
traditional games of chance could be played on tribal lands." The
Rincon raised three arguments to preclude application of this ordinance. First, the tribe objected to the ordinance because it was
not a general statute as required by Public Law 280. The court
considered this question in the context of Snohomish and found
that implicit in the result of that case was the assumption that local
ordinances qualified as laws of the state." The reference to "local
authorities" and the intent of the act were found to "suggest that
local authorities would assume the same role in relation to Indian
23.12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
24. Id.,90 Cal. Rptr. at 795. Although the case involves the application of state law
rather than a local ordinance, the case established the encumbrance test as a measure for
California courts and was heavily cited in later cases where a local ordinance was at issue.
25. Id.,
90 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
26. Id.,
90 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
27. Hacker, Meier & Pauli, State Jurisdiction over Indian Land Use: An Interpretation of
the "Encumbrance"Savings Clause of Public Law 280,9 LAND & WATER L. REV 421, 435
(1974).
28. Id.
29. 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
30. Id. at 373.
31. Id.at 374.
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citizens as they occupy with respect to other citizens of the state. 3 2
The language of the statute was considered by the court, as was
the possibility that the language might have been intended to
preclude application of local ordinances." However, the court
found that possibility inconsistent with the purpose of the act and
indicated that if such was the intent of Congress, the language
would have clearly expressed that desire. On the contrary, the intent of Congress was found to be to preserve the "customary
meaning of the phrase 'law of the state' as it is usually interpreted."'" The court dismissed the argument as contradicting the
congressional intent of the statute to make the Indians "full and
equal citizens.""3
The second contention of the Rincon was that the ordinance
was an encumbrance. The court rejected the broad definition of
encumbrance as applied by the Washington court in Snohomish
and asserted that a gambling ordinance would not be an impermissible restriction even if such a test was used.' The use of the
term in conjunction with alienation and taxation was seen as an
indication that Congress intended these words to protect the Indian from his own folly and from manipulation by swindlers. The
regulation admittedly restricted the Indians from what could have
been a profit-making activity, but the restriction was considered
justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
The restricted view of the California court (the Rhodes decision)37
which excluded criminal ordinances from consideration as encumbrances was accepted by the court.3" The ordinance in question, although admittedly restrictive
of Indian land usage, placed
3
no restrictions on the land itself.
In the last argument, the plaintiff Indians sought to preclude application of the ordinance because it was inconsistent with federal
law. 4 The court responded to this argument by asserting that
Public Law 280 had superseded earlier regulations and laws and
32. Id. at 375. "The criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory" (18
U.S.C. § 1162).
33. Id. The RESTATEMENTOF CONFLICTS § 2b was quoted in support of this interpretation.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 374.
36. Id. at 376.
37. People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970), cert. denied,404
U.S. 823 (1971).
38. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371, 377 (S.D.
Cal. 1971).
39. Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 377.
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that the tribe had only residual sovereignty which was not equal
to state law." The court held that the gambling ordinance was in
full force on the reservation.
The propriety of a possessory interest tax assessed against the
lessee of Indian reservation lands was the issue in Palm Springs
Spa, Inc. v. County of Riverside,2 which was decided in 1971.
The land in question was trust land held for the Agua Caliente Indians which had been leased for a business venture. The county
assessed a tax against the leasehold interest amounting to $264,000
cumulatively. The defendant county, while admitting to have no
authority to tax the underlying fee, maintained that the tax in
question was sufficiently remote and indirect to be permissible
under federal law. 3 The plaintiff asserted constitutional arguments
of preemption, the commerce clause, and illegal taxation of
federal property." Each of these arguments was found to be unpersuasive. The court found that the tax did not restrict tribal
sovereignty even though the tribe already had a similar tax on the
property, reasoning that such multiple taxation was common in a
federal system. 5
The question of whether the tax might constitute an impermissible encumbrance on Indian lands was briefly considered by the
court. The court reasoned that a possessory interest tax is assessed
only against the leaseholder and may be enforced only by seizure
and sale of the possessory interest. The court stated that the tax is
not secured by the underlying fee interest and cannot therefore
constitute an encumbrance on that fee.4 ' The ordinance was also
impliedly found to be a law of "general application" as required by
Public Law 280.47 The court found that Public Law 280 provided a
jurisdictional base for the imposition of the tax and that the county had acted within the scope of that authorization.
In 1972 the Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians sought a
declaration to the effect that the city of Palm Springs could not ap41. Id. at 378.
42. 18 Cal. App. 3d 372, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1971). Cases on appeal before the Ninth Circuit since Palm SpringsSpa have considered the possessory interest tax to be a state tax imposed by California law (CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 107). The court has followed the rationale of Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas County, 336 U.S. 342 (1949), and has held that
non-Indian leases are not immune from taxation. See also Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino County, 543 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977);
Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied,405 U.S. 933 (1972).
43. Id., 95 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
44. Id., 95 Cal. Rptr. at 882, 883.
45. Id., 95 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
46. Id., 95 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
47. Id., 95 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
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ply its zoning ordinance to tribal lands." In the opinion of the
court, the plaintiff's contentions were grouped as relating to legality of incorporation of Indian lands into the city, the lawfulness of
the application of zoning ordinances to Indian lands, and the constitutionality of Public Law 280. The court found no irregularity
in the inclusion of the Indian lands as a portion of Palm Springs.
The court failed to differentiate between what was simply federal
property and what was Indian trust lands, and considered to be
controlling a California state law which provided for incorporation of federal lands into cities."9
The court further found nothing to preclude application of
county zoning ordinances to trust lands and that Public Law 280
could be considered as specific authority for that application."0
The court reviewed the encumbrance test as previously applied in
some detail, tracing its development from the broad interpretation
of Snohomish to the restricted definition of Rhoades and Rincon.
The court favored the latter approach, citing the plenary authority
of Congress over the Indians and the absence of any illegal interference with tribal sovereignty to support that approach.'
The question of the constitutionality of Public Law 280 was
evaluated on the basis of a reasonable relationship to a proper
governmental objective. The court found that Congress had
adopted the policy of protection of the Indians as its traditional
policy objective and that the delegation of authority to the states
under Public Law 280 was a logical progression of the long-range
objective of integrating the Indians into society." - The court held
that the incorporation of Indian lands into the city was legally permissible and denied the request of the Agua Caliente for
declaratory relief.
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego was
heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in March of 1974." 3
Consolidated with Rincon were two other cases involving application of county ordinances to Indian activities on reservation lands.
In Ricci v. County of Riverside the plaintiff appealed from an
order of the federal district court denying her an injunction against
48. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians' Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347
F. Supp. 42, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1972), vacatedandremandedby Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in an unpublished order Jan. 24, 1975.
49. Id. at 46.
50. Id. at 48.
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied,419 U.S. 1008 (1974).
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the county to bar enforcement of a county building ordinance requiring compliance with a building code and the purchase of a
building permit.54 At the time of the initial action, the plaintiff's
husband was building a home for his family on reservation lands
and was threatened with criminal prosecution if he failed to comply with the ordinance. The district court decided in this case that
Ricci was entitled to a permanent injunction against the county
because there was no notice as to the applicability of the ordinance
to the reservation, but the court also upheld the right of the county to enforce local ordinances on the reservation.
The third case presented for consideration by the court was
Madrigal v. County of Riverside.s In this case the plaintiff sought
an injunction to block enforcement of a temporary restraining
order issued against a lessee of the plaintiff. Ms. Madrigal had
leased to another tribal trust lands assigned to her for the purpose
of organizing an Indian festival, and the county had obtained the
restraining order to stop preparation for the activity until county
ordinances requiring permits were complied with. The district
court found that Public Law 280 conferred the necessary jurisdiction of the county and that the county had properly used that
jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of county jurisdiction
over reservation lands. Rather, the court found the threshold
jurisdictional issues to be determinative in all three cases. In
Rincon, the court considered that as no member of the tribe had
actually been prosecuted under the gambling ordinance, no case
or controversy existed which was sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III of the Constitution.' The court found in
Ricci that because there had been no further prosecution by the
county, there was no "substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant consideration" and that the issue
was moot. 7 The court again found the jurisdictional issues determinative in Madrigal. Here the plaintiff claimed jurisdiction
because of a violation of civil rights or, alternatively, because of a
federal question. The court ruled that no conspiracy had been proven which would establish jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act,"
and that there was no proof of deprivation of rights sufficient to
provide a federal question."9 The decision rendered by the district
court dismissing the complaint was affirmed.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

6.
8.
6.
7.
11.
12.
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The encumbrance test was a product of judicial interpretation of
the exception specified by Congress in Public Law 280. In
Snohomish, the Washington court accepted a broad definition
which was most favorable to Indian interests and which saw even
remote intrusions as encumbrances.' The California District
Court in Rhoades accepted the validity of the test but expressly
refused to endorse the broad definition of encumbrance found in
Snohomish. ' The federal district court considered the encumbrance test valid but also refused to accept the broad definition of Snohomish (initially in Rincon). ' The case law dealing
with encumbrances could have equally well supported the broad
interpretation of this principle.' Likewise, an interpretation more
heavily reliant upon a detriment of beneficial use concept would
probably have provided greater support for the Indian case."
The "Laws of GeneralApplication" Test
The delegation of jurisdiction over Indians to the states was accomplished in the First Session of the 83d Congress in 1953.' Congress provided for the amendment to Chapter 53, Title 18, Section
1162, allowing the transfer of criminal jurisdiction. The amendment specified that "the criminal laws of such state shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the state.. .."6 State civil jurisdiction was
established by the amendment of Chapter 85, Title 28, Section
1360. The provisions of the amended section stated that "those
civil laws of such state that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
state ...."" The extent of the consideration given by the courts to
these two sections of the Code varied in the preceding cases, and
the courts were not uniform in their interpretation of how these
statutes should be applied. Generally, the courts gave little weight
60. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967),
cert. denied,389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
61. People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 823 (1971).
62. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal.
1971).
63. Cree, The Extension of County Jurisdiction over Indian Reservations in California:
PublicLaw 280 and the Ninth Circuit,25 HASTINGS L.J. 1451, 1499 (1974).
64. Id.
65. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162; 28
U.S.C. 1331, 1360.
66. Id.
67. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1978

in their decisions to this interpretive process and apparently were
confident that county ordinances were to be considered a per-

missible means of regulating reservation lands.
In Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix Irrigation
L)istrict, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an appeal
from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of expiration of the California statute of limitations." The
Capitan Grande band had filed the action seeking damages and
declaratory relief against the California Irrigation District for
alleged wrongs committed during the construction and operation
of a water works project on reservation land. The case was decided in favor of the appellant Indian tribe, the court ruling that the
appropriate statute of limitations for this case was that provided
by federal law. Within the opinion, the court discussed the
jurisdiction afforded the states under Public Law 280. The court
paid particular attention to the legislative history of the Act. It
emphasized, in a quotation from a House Report, verbiage specifying "laws ...of general application" and inferred that to be the
standard for judicial interpretation."' The court cited Rincon and
Agua Caliente as examples of areas where Congress might have
intended to extend state police power. However, later in the same
paragraph, the court again quoted from the House Report, this
time emphasizing language which clearly indicated an intent to exclude from state jurisdiction cases involving trust or restricted Indian lands."°
Approximately eight months afer the Capitan Grandecase,' the
Ninth Circuit squarely considered the issue of county jurisdiction
over Indian trust property. This question was the central factor in
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County.72 The court here

reviewed an appeal from a decision of the district court in which
that court had granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the
defendant county to prevent enforcement of county zoning ordinances on the reservation lands." The controversy arose when
the county sought to enforce a county ordinance restricting the use
of mobile homes as residences.
68. Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix Irrigation Dist., 514 F.2d 465 (9th
Cir. 1975).
69. Id. at 468.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 465.
72. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
73. Opinion of district court not reported. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,
CIV. No. F-836 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1973).
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The court prefaced its discussion of the issues of the case with a
discussion of the jurisdiction granted the states under Public Law
280. The inherent power of the state to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction was preempted by extensive federal regulatory activity in Indian law. The court said that the legislation in the area left
little doubt that Congress intended the states to have only that
power over the Indians as was specifically granted.' In the final
analysis, the court found that the power of the states to regulate
Indians as granted by Public Law 280 was specifically as
delineated in the Act with all other jurisdiction reserved to either
the federal government or the tribes.73
In the context of this interpretation of the powers granted under
Public Law 280, the court then proceeded to analyze the key issue
of the case. The basic concept established by the court at the
outset of the discussion was that county ordinances were not state
laws of general application.' The court stated that the language of
Section 1360 of Title 28 of the United States Code could be read
either as restricting state jurisdiction to civil laws of state wide application as adopted by the state legislature or, by admittedly
strained interpretation, as inclusive of local ordinances. The court
found that the restrictive reading of Public Law 280, that is, state
laws only, was more consistent with Congress' trust obligation.
Although Congress could legally repudiate this obligation, the
court determined that this was not the intent of the passage of
Public Law 280. An extension of local regulation of Indians was
found to be inconsistent with tribal self-determination and
seriously detrimental to the promotion of tribal economic selfsufficiency." The court refused to accept an argument that the Act
Was assimilationist in intent and announced that the restrictive
construction was consistent with the current congressional
policy.7' The court stated that exclusion of local regulation was
mandated by existent federal policies, and furthermore, if an issue
was of sufficient importance to warrant state interest, it could be
brought within the scope of state control by state legislative enactment.
After the court rejected local regulation as inconsistent with the
general application test, it went on to hypothesize that even if the
74. Santa
denied,429
75. Id.
76. Id. at
77. Id.at
78. Id.at
79. Id.

Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
U.S. 1038 (1977).
659.
660.
661.
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county ordinance in question had met that criterion, it would have
been found to be an unacceptable encumbrance.' Secretarial
regulations deny the states the right to impose requirements on
trust lands which are inconsistent with federal law, and although
state zoning is considered permissible under these rules, application of similar county ordinances is specifically precluded. The
court found that absent a special grant of jurisdiction to the state
by Congress, the states remain unable to regulate trust lands.'" The
term "encumbrance" was viewed by the court as not simply a
restriction on alienation of the fee, but rather as any hindrance
which depreciates the "value, use and enjoyment of the land."'"
Such an interpretation was found to be consistent with the traditional canon of judicial construction which requires resolution of
questions, where doubt exists, in favor of the Indians.
Conclusion
The applicability of local laws to Indian lands has been a matter
of considerable concern in the courts of the Ninth Circuit because
of the proximity of Indian lands to developed urban areas, particularly in California. The problem was further magnified by the
uncertainty of the scope of the jurisdiction granted by Public Law
280. When the matter was first considered before the courts, there
was a presumption that the local laws were applicable. The courts
considered the only restriction on the imposition of these laws to
be that they not encumber the land. The main preoccupations of
the courts in the early cases were those of defining the parameters
of "encumbrance" and establishing how broad or narrow the test
would be. In Rincon the "laws of general application" language
was interpreted to mean only that Indians were to be assured
treatment equal with all other citizens." In Agua Caliente, the
court viewed this language as restricting local jurisdiction only to
the extent that such jurisdiction was inconsistent with federal
treaties, agreements, and statutes.' The court adopted a firmer
position in Capitan Grande, recognizing that the laws of general
application language constituted a significant restriction." The
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 664.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371, 375 (S.D.

Cal. 1971).
84. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians' Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347
F. Supp. 42, 48 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
85. Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix Irrigation Dist., 514 F.2d 465, 468
(gth Cir. 1975).
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Ninth Circuit developed a definitive stand on the issue in Santa
Rosa.' That court now clearly stands on the literal language of the
statute and holds that local ordinances are not state laws of
general application and are therefore inapplicable when dealing
with Indians on federally reserved lands. The reading of the
statutory language now used by the court precludes local regulation of activities of the Indians on their lands. This position, if
maintained by the court, will preserve the right of the Indians to
develop their lands in accordance with their economic needs and
cultural traditions. Furthermore, this interpretation is consonant
with recent congressional acts, particularly the recently adopted
policy of Indian self-determination and with the complete congressional rejection of the assimilationist philosopy of the 1950's. The
Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca County7 quoted from the Santa
Rosa opinion and stated that the courts "are not obligated in ambiguous instances to strain to implement [an assimilationist]
policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will
interfere with what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."

86. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
87. 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976), quotingfrom Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,
532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975).
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